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Two decades ago, Greece and Ireland stood passive spectators of political, economic 
and technological developments at the core of an emerging European Economic 
Community. Away from the industrial centres of Europe, the attainment and 
application of new ideas, it seemed, had no place among the prescriptions of policy. 
The pursuit of each country’s comparative advantage dictated that they be net 
consumers of technological wares invented elsewhere. And while a lot has changed in 
the meantime, a great deal has also endured. 
 
Today, innovation is no longer confined to the fringes of industrial policy; it features 
prominently, throughout the continent, as ‘the solution’ to the re-discovered riddle of 
competitiveness. Ideas on how to best mobilise intellectual assets for innovation 
abound. Theory suggests that institutions are important in shaping productive efforts 
towards innovation; the experiences of Ireland and Greece offer a fitting testing 
ground. 
 
Ireland has made strides in the FDI route to prosperity, no longer enjoying a 
‘cohesion’ status. Greece however faces pressing economic problems, in the aftermath 
of celebrated, largesse-fuelled growth. Over the period in question though, nowhere 
else have the differences between the two countries become more accentuated (and 
apparent), as in matters of innovation. We propose that the key to these differences 
lies with the drafting of policy and the consequent shaping of their institutions. We 
observe that importing solutions from abroad, with Greece looking to Brussels and 
Ireland to the US, was central to their respective experiences. 
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Assessing the performance of an economy for any given period is a complex affair; 
current dynamics and the breadth of options available to policy makers are determined 
among other things by history and geography. The paths to economic development 
followed by both Ireland and Greece have variably intersected and diverged over the 
last half century. Adherence to Keynesianism in the post war period had different 
ramifications for Ireland and different for Greece. By the 1980s both countries were 
looking to Brussels for solutions to their deep rooted economic problems. In the 
following two decades policy prescriptions in the area of Science Technology and 
Innovation (STI) played a crucial role in their development trajectories. Ireland has 
made strides in the FDI route to prosperity, no longer enjoying a ‘cohesion’ status. 
Greece however faces pressing economic problems, in the aftermath of celebrated, 
largesse-fuelled growth. 
 
On a superficial level comparing Ireland and Greece may look like a simple task of 
comparing successful and less successful European economies at the start of the 21
st 
century, however, the situation is somewhat more complex. For instance, and of 
special relevance here, neither country is an example of success in terms of innovation 
as measured by the Commission (EIS, 2003). For all the attention it has received over 
the last 10 years as ‘the world’s leading exporter of software’, Ireland is still far from 
being a world leader by any accepted measure of innovation. Greece, while not 
enjoying the high levels of growth like Ireland, also fares poorly. While we recognise 
that the link between innovation and growth is, in both cases, open to question, we 
propose that ‘innovation policy’ is an effective focusing instrument for broader 
industrial development. In the following sections we show how different approaches 
to such policy have differentiated the experiences of the two countries in the last two 
decades. 
 
Both Ireland and Greece have committed to the Lisbon Agenda and have laid out 
plans to induce improvements in their national innovative capacity (Furman, Porter 
and Stern, 2002). And while we agree that increasing innovative output is an 
important end in its own right – we highlight that the rhetoric of innovation is a potent 
focusing mechanism for approaching industrial and broader economic development 
issues. Here we attempt to map out the different approaches that have led to a 
divergence in their shared path, the institutions and actors that differentiated their 
cases. We also question the extent to which imported solutions to national problems 
are appropriate. In doing so we recognise value in expanding the definition of 
innovation to include novel approaches to governance. The following paper examines 
the Irish and Greek cases separately before concluding.  
 
 
THE IRISH CASE 
 
The relative youth of the Irish economy makes its transformation over the last 20 
years all the more notable. Attaining the status of Republic in 1948 26 years after it 
became independent of British rule, the road to economic success over the preceding 
years has been a ‘rocky one’ (O’Grada, 1997). At independence the Irish state had a 
living standard near the average of most Europeans of the time. By the end of the   3
Second World War Ireland was facing forty years with the label of Europe’s ‘poor 
man’. There are many different interpretations as to how Ireland managed to turn 
itself around by the start of the 21
st century. The nationalist interpretation places the 
blame for Ireland’s lack of development prior to 1950 squarely on the shoulders of 
Great Britain. It cites evidence that Irish economic fortunes improved once 
dependence on British markets ended (O’Hagan, 1995). This view is not too 
dissimilar from dependency theory which emphasises the harmful results of links 
between a centre and periphery. Theorists such as Munck, 1993 identified the 
mechanisms whereby external forms of dependence created internal forms of uneven 
development (Kirby, 2002).     
 
In fact, dependency theory can be reapplied to the Irish case in the early 1990s. 
Replacing the dependent relationship on an ex-colonial power was a new dependence 
on the influx of foreign investment into Ireland. For the likes of O’Hearn (1989; 1990; 
1998) Ireland’s new dependency was characterised by radical free trade, free 
enterprise and foreign industrial domination. He draws a direct correlation between 
this and the lack of any critical mass in indigenous industry unable to withstand the 
competitive pressures of such ‘radical’ free trade. In true dependency theory style, 
O’Hearn examined the ‘continual oppression of Ireland within a dynamic structure of 
global capitalism’ (1993: 2). On which he places the blame for rising social 
inequalities through the creation of a rich investing class at the expense of a low 
skilled service class. Others are less convinced (see MacLaughlin, 1994; Kirby, 2002) 
they point to increasing living standards across all sectors of Irish society resulting 
from the influx in investment monies and a lack of an alternative practical solution 
(O’Donnell, 2000). 
  
While valuable, where much of the dependency theory as applied to Ireland falls 
down is in taking a narrow view of Ireland in the global context. In fact, a great deal 
of complexity lies behind the flows of capital and labour into and out of Ireland the 
work of O’Riain (1998; 2000; 2004), Kennedy (1998) and O’Malley (1998) goes 
some of the way to highlighting this. Taking a more political economy approach in 
the late 1990s O’Riain moved away from the singular view of foreign direct 
investment as a positive or negative and went on to define Ireland as a flexible 
developmental state, by which he meant an ability to bring global networks of flow 
down to the local level through the nodal presence of MNCs in Ireland. So while 
admitting there are problems of profit repatriation within the MNC sectors he also 
highlights the positive contribution made via their sub-supply linkages and spill-over 
effect (O’Riain, 2004). Taking a similar line, O’Donnell (2000) sees Ireland’s place in 
Europe as central to its recent transformation, primarily through economic and social 
governance (he points to the handprint of the EU on one of the Irish government’s 
most innovative policies, the social partnership that commenced in the late 1980s). 
For both O’Riain and O’Donnell the place of the state in Ireland’s success is key. 
Recent work carried out by Collins and Grimes (2005) adds to the efforts of O’Riains 
later work by attempting to place Ireland in networks of global production. Wary of 
the critique of the Irish FDI development model, they attempt to re-define 
embeddedness in the Irish context by examining the process of leveraging of power 
by foreign-owned multinational affiliates in Ireland. This global-local view as seen in 
Coe et al (2004) goes beyond the simplicity of the dependency school of thought 
through the empirical analysis of non-Irish operations gaining regional and global 
remits over product flow.    4
Ireland’s development towards a knowledge based economy and the innovation 
focus.  
 
For many, the seeds of the now well renowned Celtic Tiger were sown as early as the 
1960s and are most easily identified with liberalisation. Economic liberalisation took 
place in three elements: firstly, the use of grants and tax concessions to encourage 
export-oriented production; secondly, the attraction of foreign manufacturing 
enterprises; thirdly, dismantling protection in return for greater access to markets 
abroad (Kennedy et al, 1988). It was the second which assumed dominance. As 
O’Grada put it:  
“At the outset few foresaw the rapid growth of the foreign sector, but direct 
foreign investment in Irish industry soon became the cornerstone of government 
policy…The remarkable transformation of the economy between the late 1950s 
and the early 1970s may be largely attributed to the arrival of the 
multinationals” (1997, 114).  
 
Irish industrialisation since the late 1960s was characterised by more sophisticated 
products such as machinery, pharmaceuticals, instruments and electronics. Ireland 
was the first country to establish what came to be known as an export processing 
zone
1. This was one example of the government’s foreign investment-led, export-
oriented industrialisation strategy. By 1973, overseas firms in Ireland accounted for 
almost one-third of all employment in manufacturing (68,500 out of 219,000). By 
1983, there were almost 1,000 foreign firms in Ireland who had invested well over 
(IR)£4 billion in the country; half of them came from the US, one-eighth from Britain 
and one-tenth from Germany (O’Grada, 1997, 115). Between 1958 and 1973, 
manufacturing output grew by 6.7% per annum while manufacturing employment 
grew by a more modest 2.4% per annum (O’Malley 1992). Exports as a percentage of 
gross output grew more dramatically, from 19.4% in 1960 to 41% in 1978. 
 
With a panoply of tax breaks and subsidies, Ireland successfully induced foreign 
companies to set up branches in Ireland, and by 1974 new industry accounted for over 
60% of industrial output. Indeed the 10% tax on profits in manufacturing had made 
the country something of a tax haven. However, by the nature of this type of 
industrialisation, backward linkages in terms of purchasing and sub-contracting to 
indigenous firms were weak owing to the basic manufacturing nature of foreign 
branch plants.  
 
Economic liberalisation was important in the Irish case and a key enabler of that was 
the Industrial Development Authority; IDA Ireland. Since its inception in 1949, 
through its overseas offices it sold Ireland’s advantages to generations of executives 
around the world though most successfully to the US. In 1992 it was restructured and 
became the Industrial Development Agency
2, as a result it placed greater emphasis on 
developing MNC subsidiaries and worked closely with their management to support 
efforts to win mandates in higher-value added activities such as advanced 
manufacturing, R&D, Supply Chain Management and shared services. As Ireland’s 
                                                 
1 Established when the Shannon Free Airport Development Company was set up in 1958 in the 
Midwest region. This State-backed industrial zone handed out special incentives to attract foreign 
investors to import materials which underwent some degree of processing before being exported again 
2 The Authority was essentially split in two with the creation of Enterprise Ireland a development 
agency solely focused on indigenous industry.    5
cost advantage eroded, it sought to carefully target FDI in new sectors such as bio-
pharma and e-business. More recently, inspired by global restructuring and 
organisational change the Agency has placed more emphasis on R&D (see below) 
(Begley et al, 2005).  
 
1973 saw Ireland’s accession into the European Economic Community. Following the 
signing of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement and subscription to GATT in 1965 
and 1967 respectively, Ireland’s membership of the EU had truly opened up to free 
trade. Now, over 30 years later – funds worth €53 million have been transferred from 
the EU and when contributions are taken into account, Ireland’s net receipts amount 
to €35 billion. What Ireland’s membership of the EU also meant was access to a 
greater (one of the world’s largest) market. This embellished the original remit of the 
IDA and Ireland’s attempt to attract investment from abroad. US FDI in particular 
recognised the increased attractiveness of Ireland as a location to serve the EU. This is 
supported by figure 1 where when we consider Irish population at 1% of the EU total 
we see Ireland punching well above its weight.  
 
Figure 1. Foreign Direct Investment in Europe and Ireland.  
Bn €  2000 2001 2002 
European Union  689 389 374 
Ireland  26 16 19 
Ireland as a % of 
EU 
3.7% 4.1% 5.1% 
         Forfas  (2004)   
 
Ireland’s recent economic success can be attributed to a wide range of factors, from 
EU structural funds, social partnerships on wage agreements between the government, 
trade unions and employers, to increased inward investment. It is the type of inward 
investment that was attracted that has been fundamental to the newfound prosperity. 
The conscious focus on the software industry has been pivotal, enabling the country to 
become the highest exporter of software in the world, exporting over €8bn worth of 
products annually (ibid).  
 
FDI, which totalled $164 million in 1985, skyrocketed throughout the 1990s. The 
inward FDI volume in 1995 added up to $1.45 billion, $2.74 billion in 1997, $11.04 
billion in 1998, $14.93 billion in 1999 and $16.32 billion in 2000. From 1991-1998, 
foreign-owned firms accounted for 95 percent of the growth in Irish industrial 
exports, and by 1999 foreign-owned industry accounted for an estimated 38 billion 
euro, or almost three-quarters of total Irish exports. Foreign direct investment flows 
into Ireland in the 1990s originated mostly from export-oriented United States 
multinationals. By 1998, U.S.-owned companies in Ireland were responsible for 70 
percent of Irish industrial exports. By 2002 the overall stock of FDI in Ireland was 
equivalent to 129% of GDP (158% of GNP) – higher than any other country 
benchmarked and some distance ahead of second (Forfas, 2004; IDA, 2005). 
 
Thus, Ireland has pursued its economic development path with a great deal of 
emphasis on exogenous factors. For dependency theorists and political economy 
thinkers alike many statistics can highlight the negative impacts of this model, not 
least the dwarfing of indigenous enterprise by their foreign-owned neighbours and the 
increasing social inequality of Ireland’s newfound wealth. That said the growth   6
trajectory that Ireland has followed has made it the envy of many other EU states not 
least the former cohesion states. To this end the next section will attempt to map out 
in greater detail the innovative side of Ireland’s economic development by focusing 
on policy and policy enactors. Juxtaposing the Irish case with the Greek one helps to 
make the different paths chosen easier to pinpoint relative to each other.  
 
An Innovative Ireland – but not as you know it.  
 
What makes the Irish case even more noteworthy in the European context is the lack 
of a positive correlation between its newfound wealth and the current state of Irish 
innovation as measured by traditional indicators. From the above we can easily 
recognise the dominance of the multinational, especially high-tech multinationals. 
Less than 1/3 of foreign-owned MNCs carried out R&D in 2001 (300 out of 900ish) 
of these a mere 20 firms accounted for over 2/3 spent on R&D (Forfas, 2004). This is 
not industry specific either – for all the IDA talk on focusing on high tech industries 
in a high tech Ireland: Ireland’s R&D as a percentage of output of the foreign owned 
ICT sector was 1.2% which compares poorly to the OECD average of 5.6%. How this 
rather negative snapshot of ‘knowledge-based’ Ireland fits with the success of recent 
years involves looking back over industrial policy and especially innovation policy.  
 
Talk of science technology and innovation was far from the policy making tables in 
Ireland prior to the 1970s. For the most part science and industrial policy were geared 
solely towards solving Ireland’s massive unemployment problem. The IDA oriented 
its strategy towards attracting companies in the electronics, chemicals and other high 
tech sectors with high export potential. This was not an articulated technology policy, 
but a response to the availability of a relatively well-educated workforce, an 
advantage which Ireland held in comparison with other newly industrialising 
countries seeking foreign investment (Cogan and McDevitt, 2000). By the start of the 
1980s policy documents were beginning to find holes in the one-track approach 
towards industrial development. The Telesis report of 1982 was critical of short-
termism inherent in the FDI model. Most criticism was concentrated on the lack of 
embeddedness and linkages between foreign owned operations and the local 
economy. A National Linkages Programme set up by Forbairt in 1985 to counter this 
achieved little. The fact is no real pressure was put on MNCs. By 1996, out of 2,667 
SMEs only 174 were sub-suppliers to MNCs, the sectoral distribution of which would 
hardly be described as hi-tech. 114 were in plastics, fabricated metals or 
paper/printing products, 33 in electrical engineering or computers and 2 in chemicals 
(Breathnach and Kelly 1999). 
 
The publication of the Science and Technology Act in 1987 saw the first attempt to 
integrate with industrial policy. S&T policy was given a central role with the 
administration and its own Minister of State. “The aims [of Science and Development 
Programme] is to develop in Ireland the level of technological capability necessary to 
underpin the competitiveness and more rapid development of industry. Technology is 
a major force in the creation of wealth and jobs” (Government, 1988 in Cogan and 
McDevitt, 2000). Innovation policy in the 1990s is marked firstly by the publication 
of the Culiton Report and the sustained campaign which followed resulting in the 
establishment of a Science Technology and Innovation Advisory Council (STIAC) in 
1995 and the White Paper on Science Technology and Innovation which was 
published a year later. A common theme ran through each, the need to move away   7
from dependence on exogenous factors by concentrating on R&D and doing work of 
higher value add: for which innovation was key. The formation of the Irish for 
Science Technology and Innovation (ICSTI) followed. The new institution was 
mandated “to advise the government on the strategic direction of science and 
technology policy, embracing all aspects including scientific research, higher 
education, technology and R&D in industry”.(Cogan and McDevitt, 2000). The main 
outcome of which was the restructuring of the IDA, which focused itself explicitly on 
foreign investors while the development of indigenous industry became the remit of 
Enterprise Ireland.  
 
While innovation was bandied about in the 1990s, it never really gained the type of 
broad appeal that employment creation policies gained in the 1970s and 1980s. There 
are two main reasons for this: first is the coincidence of rising productivity of Irish 
operations that came about during the advance of the Celtic Tiger. Second, innovation 
is a much less tangible construct and as a result of its somewhat loose definition it was 
less likely to embed itself in public consciousness. Therefore, throughout the ‘golden 
era’ of the 1990s much of Irish industry found ‘little need to change what was not 
broken’. Also a great deal of the work being carried out in Ireland, while it was 
dominated by ‘high-tech’ industries, in many cases, there was little high tech in what 
they did. In the software sector for instance, it was basic manufacturing with some 
localisation and shared services: activities that lie at the opposite end of the value 
chain from research and development. For this reason many of the policies and 
agendas pushed by policy makers had little relevance for the main part.  
 
In the past five years, some considerable changes have occurred in Irish industry, not 
least the restructuring that was necessary post 2000/2001. What role innovation policy 
has had to play on this is questionable. It is true however, that the policies enacted in 
the past number of years have been more targeted and as a result more effective in at 
least raising consciousness regarding R&D and innovation. This can be seen by 
looking at the relative amounts of money earmarked for STI investment over two 
phases: 1995-1999 €0.5 billion while in the NDP covering the years 2000- 2006 the 
government committed €2.5 billion of public money to be invested in STI (OECD, 





Perhaps more than other EU states Ireland was willing to follow the EU lead in 
focusing on the knowledge based economy. As we have seen, little in terms of real 
innovation policy had ever taken hold in Ireland in the 1970s and 1980s. It is true that 
greater structural changes inspired by the EU have had enormous effects on its 
member states like de-regulation. Yet as tightly as Ireland could follow the 
‘innovative lead’ of Europe, it’s expenditure on R&D remains 2/3 of the EU average.  
 
On the more subtle side of things, looking at EU policy in terms of the promoting 
innovation through Information Society initiatives a clearer line of influence becomes 
apparent. For more than 20 years the EU’s Framework Programme of research had 
been playing a modest role in increasing the R&D capacity of cohesion countries like 
Ireland. Grimes and Collins (2003) sought to uncover the role of one EU initiative 
played in promoting the knowledge economy in Ireland. Using the ESPRIT (part of   8
the fourth framework programme which ran under the prior three FPs) a programme 
which focused on pre-competitive research (R&D removed from the market focusing 
on generic technologies) they showed that for many businesses in Ireland throughout 
the 1980s this was the only way to fund innovative actions: “Esprit allowed us to 
undertake certain development that we couldn’t have undertaken without that funding. 
Also it exposed us to real world issues” (Interview with CEO of founder of 
indigenous tech company). Yet for many the funding only provided a brief foray into 
the world of R&D, however, the programme was responsible for the creation and 
promotion of informal collaborations of actors from different backgrounds which 
proved beneficial to Irish industry as a whole (see Grimes and Collins, 2003).  
 
Closely related to the ESPRIT programme with a high overlap of participants are the 
Programmes in Advanced Technologies (PATs). These programmes fostered 
technology transfer between university research departments and private enterprise. 
Initiated in the early 1990s in partnership between Enterprise Ireland, industry and 
universities, the PATs have benefited from ERDF support since 2000 to improve the 
quality of their services and their capacity to respond to emerging technologies. In 
ensuring more effective links between the academic and industrial sectors, the PATs 
(now termed “initiatives in specific advanced technologies”) aim to provide better 
commercial results from public investment in research. The ERDF provided support 
of around €76 million, about one third of total project costs.  
 
Whether it is on the micro (project) level or macro (policy) level the handprint of 
Brussels can be found in Ireland’s approach to innovation. This is most recently seen 
in the publication of the 2004 Action Plan “Building Ireland’s Knowledge Economy-
the Irish Action Plan for Increasing Research and Development by 2010”, a report 
prepared by a high-level Inter Departmental Steering Group. The evolution of this 
group can be traced back to the Lisbon Agenda of 2000. Following on from this the 
heads of State met in Barcelona and agreed to target an R&D spend of 3% of GDP by 
2010. In 2003 the Commission published the actions required to achieve this entitled 
“Investing in Research: An Action Plan for Europe”. It was in response to this that the 
Minister for Enterprise Trade and Employment established the high level group that 
set out its vision for R&D as: 
“Ireland by 2010 will be internationally renowned for the excellence of its research 
and be at the forefront in generating and using new knowledge for economic and 
social progress, within an innovation driven culture”. 
Very much influenced by the master document of 2003, the above is replicated in its 
goals in many of the other member states 
 
Yet, Ireland has been and remains different to the other EU states in terms of its 
performance in the face of relatively poor innovation levels. Here we briefly try to 
uncover why. In asking this question, we have looked and the economy and society of 
Ireland and found how it differentiates itself – its openness and not just with regard 
the EU but more especially with regard its other major investor, the US.  
 
As we have seen from above a significant majority of the FDI in Ireland comes from 
the US, however, this has not done much to impact the rather poor innovation 
expenditure. What first comes to mind is the dependency theory critique of Ireland’s 
development set out by writers such as O’Hearn (2002) and Kirby (2002). Yet, from 
work carried out on the foreign-owned tech sector we see a different story begin to   9
emerge. While it may be true that for the most part, MNCs in Ireland are doing little 
in terms of value added, it would be unfair to say that none are moving up the value 
chain. A recent survey by the IMI (2005) with over 250 respondents from the MNC 
sector over half claimed to have increased the remit / control of their Irish operation 
significantly in the past 3 years, in essence moving the operation away from its 
original remit and up the ‘value-chain’ (see Birkinshaw, 1997). Case studies on the 
process of leveraging control are depicted in detail in Collins and Grimes (2005). 
What is little regarded by any indicators or yardsticks nationally or internationally is 
that this very process is innovation itself.  
 
This is something that has been foremost in the minds of many of the Irish managers 
of US owned operations in Ireland. Many see the movement upwards away from the 
basic or original remit (usually manufacturing) as something of an innovative process 
which can garner increased levels of control of an affiliate as well as higher value 
added work with increased returns to the local economy. What is most interesting is 
the lack of linearity seen by most managers in the end-point of R&D at the top of the 
value chain. Therefore, many see innovation as the taking on of different remits and 
not necessarily creating employment in the research laboratory. There is a feeling 
among some of the bigger organisations located here, that the advantage may not 
necessarily lie in a country of researchers:  “R&D is as footloose as manufacturing” 
“What I want this operation to have is control, and that is more easily got through 
global/regional remits over the production process than R&D on its own” “the Irish 
focus on R&D may have gone too far, I will find it very difficult to sell Ireland as a 
good location to carry out high-end manufacturing” (various interviews 05/06) 
 
The place of the IDA in this is crucial. As a policy enactor its influence over the type 
and sustainability of operations located in Ireland is paramount (see Pontikakis et al, 
2006). Something of a change in the direction of the organisation can be deemed from 
the following quote by its CEO: “The expansion of existing clients… is important 
because their contribution is something we expect to grow in the future. This is 
happening not only because it is a logical consequence of the critical mass we have 
now built up in several sectors, it is also now a key focus of policy”. (IDA, 2004 p.ii) 
 
Statistics back this logic; repeat investments have taken over Greenfield investments 
by foreign investors and are seen as the spark of Irish recovery after the lull of 
2000/2001. The IDA’s ability to work closely with its clients alongside other forums 
such as the American Chamber of Commerce have created a unique environment in 
Ireland that some have termed ‘tribal or clan-like’. This refers to the willingness of 
industry leaders to put the constantly refer too and think about what is good for the 
country as well as what is good for their company. As one senior scientific advisor put 
it. “It’s like everyone in the MNC sector have their ‘Ireland Inc’ hats which they don 
in the interests of the country as a whole… It is almost subversive behaviour above 
and beyond their job remit, it amazes me, you have cut throat rivals [in business] 
sitting opposite each other thinking up ideas that work for their rivals – as well as 
themselves.” (Interview SFI, 2006). These unique factors alongside industrial 
upgrading are what has given Ireland its competitive edge over the past 6 years and 
can be seen (although difficult to measure) as the true innovation that is fuelled 
economic growth.  
   10
Irish Case Conclusion 
 




























Ireland’s geographic location as well as its history has divided its loyalties between 
the EU and the US. Both are huge contributors to the Irish success story and will 
continue to be as Ireland looks to the future. This is depicted through a brief look at 
Ireland’s somewhat schizophrenic innovation system. Ireland’s use of STI policy and 
catchphrases are employed second-hand from Europe, European monies keep many of 
Ireland’s flagship innovation projects afloat. Yet the ease at which Ireland marries this 
with its relationship with the US, is what makes the case particularly interesting. An 
example of which is the research body, Science Foundation Ireland. Run by the 
Department for Enterprise, Trade and Employment, SFI was inspired by the 
technology foresight exercise in 1998, which itself was inspired by the European 
Commission. SFI was allocated €711 million of government money and was 
essentially based on the US model of the National Science Foundation. “Until 
recently, SFI was full of US accents, there were guys from the NSF that helped get the 
thing off the ground…Other EU states tried to emulate… but the main difference with 
these guys is the fact that they would not be willing to let Americans run the show in 
the outset, we in Ireland do not seem to have that problem.” (SFI – director – 
interview). A reality which was also expressed by Ireland’s second in Command:    
The BOSTON influence  The BRUSSELS influence  
Through (re) 
investments in 
Ireland – shared 
work 
practices/training  




Society to the KBE.  
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“As Irish people our relationships with the United States and the European Union are 
complex. Geographically we are closer to Berlin than Boston. Spiritually we are 
probably a lot closer to Boston than Berlin”. (Tainsite Mary Harney) 
 http://www.entemp.ie/press/2000/210700.htm 
 
What the above diagram also depicts is the different, but no less important innovation 
results. This is perhaps most easily divided between the EU focus on R&D and the 
more tangible product innovation and the Boston focus on the less tangible process 
innovation. Both have immediate implications for the Irish economy and its ability to 
sustain its current growth rate. Yet the Ireland’s STI policy has taken somewhat of a 
blinkered approach to this dualism more recently. This has seen the publication of 
policy documents with a somewhat linear view of both innovation and the place of 
productivity in Ireland. This has brought with it the narrow view of innovation as 
R&D and little else, yet as the above has attempted to prove, innovation is a much 
broader phenomenon, and according to one of the most productive sectors in Ireland, 
the US MNCs, something that STI policy needs to address.      
 
 
THE GREEK CASE 
 
Policy interest in technology matters has existed in one form or another for much of 
Greece’s recent history. Although intentions did not always translate into action, ideas 
on how to best encourage the transfer, spread and indigenous generation of 
technology date at least as far back as the 1950s. The Greek economy experienced 
exceptional growth from the 1950s up to the early 1970s
3, for there was plenty of 
room for economic expansion; the Second World War and the brief but destructive 
Civil War that ensued, had effectively devastated the country’s industrial capacity and 
public infrastructure, had polarised Greek society and left confidence in its institutions 
in ruins. Policy planners recognised an opportunity to foster economic transformation, 
although they rarely agreed on how this might be best achieved. That was the subject 
of intense policy debate at the time, resulting in starkly distinct propositions. 
Digressions focused on a range of issues, most notably regarding the extent of 
government involvement and the particular ‘model’ of industrial and economic 
organisation that should be adhered to. Proposals included the encouragement of full-
blown industrialisation along Western-European lines (Prof. Zolotas), an exclusive 
focus on the development of the agricultural sector (Prof. Varvaressos) as well as the 
promotion of  central planning and state control of “heavy industry” in the image of 
the Soviet model (D. Batsis)  (Drakatos, 1997; Psalidopoulos, 2004). Few were failing 
to notice the central role of technology in economic affairs
4; however the extent to 
which the Greek economy was in a position to productively assimilate the fruits of 
innovation was heavily contested
5. Ideology, factional affiliations and national 
                                                 
3 Often termed the ‘take off period’ and even the ‘Greek economic miracle’. 
4 The contemporary proliferation of mass media (and the extent to which they acted as conduits for 
WWII, and subsequently, Cold-War propaganda) had a profound effect on public consciousness. The 
imagery of marching machines in the battlefield, in production as well as in civic life delivered a potent 
message; the association of advanced technology (and technological advancement itself) with both 
absolute and relative national prosperity. 
5 Notably Prof. Varvaressos, in his report presented to the Bank of Greece in 1952 underplayed the 
potential impact of technology transfer as he believed higher production levels were owed to the 
existence of “an entire range of favourable conditions lacking in the poorer nations” and that the use   12
antipathies meant that consensus as to how to proceed was difficult to achieve – as 
evidenced by the eventual adoption of no plan at all until 1953. 
 
It was then that a Programme for Economic Reconstruction was put forward, backed 
to a significant extent by foreign aid in the form of the Marshall Plan. In it, for the 
first time in Greek reality, economic policy attributed a key role to matters of 
technology – of course not yet coherently articulated as an ‘innovation’ or even 
‘technology’ policy per se but then implicit in the normative suggestions of planners 
regarding industrial structure. The Programme called for a sharp focus on 
manufacturing, with the core of its prescriptions featuring measures to encourage the 
creation of “sustainable industrial units using appropriate equipment and new 
technology” (Drakatos, 1997:31). The contemporary situation did not allow for an 
industrial leap; rather the bulk of funds were spent on ‘emergency’ infrastructure and 
subsidies for the primary sector. Ambitious in scale, the Programme envisaged large 
energy infrastructure projects (state owned hydroelectric and thermoelectric power 
stations and closely linked lignite extraction facilities), transport and communications 
infrastructure as well as the provision of generous manufacturing subsidies and tax-
breaks (Stasinopoulos, 2006). While many of its targets were eventually met, 
haphazard execution, political wrangling and the gradual withdrawal of foreign aid 
meant that it was not implemented in its entirety
6. 
 
Arguably one the most profound effects the Programme had was in focusing public 
debate on a loosely defined target of “industrialisation”. Among policy advocates, 
irrespective of conviction, a common vocabulary emerged, featuring such terms as 
“heavy industry”, “novell methods” and “modernisation”
7. The results of industrial 
dirigisme begun to become apparent by the end of the decade. By the 1960s a number 
of state-owned or state-supported companies were active in the energy, utilities and 
mineral extraction sectors. At the same time there was increasing participation of the 
private sector in this government-led industrialisation process. Private investment, 
both domestic and foreign, helped establish internationally competitive production 
outlets (aluminium, steel, shipbuilding, petrochemicals and oil refining, chemicals, 
fertilisers, cement etc) (Drakatos, 1997). These were sectors where Greece possessed 
an obvious comparative advantage (in terms of cost, resources, location) and were 
receiving continuous state sponsorship and so presented almost risk-free investment 
options. According to Drakatos (1997) manufacturing growth was driven by both 
strong domestic consumption and considerable increases in exports
8. Closely 
associated was the drastic growth in construction activity, fuelled by rising incomes 
and the rapid urbanisation process. Moreover, on the political front, Greece sought 
accession to the emergent EEC. The signing of the Athens Agreement granted Greece 
the status of Associate Member of the Community (entailing a limited-scope customs 
union and access to a $125m-strong ‘productive investment’ fund) effective from 
November 1962.  
                                                                                                                                            
of technology “is the result of, not the reason for, the existence of favourable production conditions” 
(Papadimitriou, 2003:2). 
6 Drakatos (1997) argues that the Programme’s role was “indicative”, as “…the execution [of its 
targets] was hampered by the lack of an institutionalised process of monitoring and control” 
(Drakatos: 32). 
7 Developments in Greek economic policy at the time are well documented in Drakatos (1997), Dertilis 
and Fragkiadis (1997), Psalidopoulos (2004) and Stasinopoulos (2006). 
8 As an indication, Drakatos (1997: 62) calculates that total exports increased by a factor of 50 in the 
period 1957-1972.   13
 
Despite this period’s achievements in delivering rapid economic growth, employment 
increases and general improvements in welfare, planners had failed to deliver the 
promised profound structural changes that would ensure long-term sustainability. At 
the end of the 1960s the country’s main products remained concentrated in a handful 
of traditional, labour-intensive sectors (primarily textiles, food and beverages) that 
presented few opportunities for returns to technical change. Moreover these industries 
were characterised by high-industrial concentration (Dertilis and Fragkiadis, 1997; 
Varvaressos, 2002) and political stewardship (Stasinopoulos, 2006) that shielded them 
from the potential leverage of either demand-pull or supply-push technical change. 
The modest success that was the creation of a fledgling manufacturing sector 
represented a potential stepstone to higher-value manufacturing and associated 
services. Unfortunately though, it is only with hindsight that this opportunity has been 
appreciated. It appears as if industrial policy (as distinct from general macroeconomic 
management) lost its purpose once the flow of foreign aid was halted. Perhaps Greek 
political reality at the time made it impossible to appreciate; the 1967-1974 military 
dictatorship detracted from long-term development planning and further undermined 
confidence in the country’s political, legal and economic institutions
9. More directly, 
the ensuing international isolation put an abrupt end to a tentative wave of foreign 
direct investment from third countries seeking to benefit from access to EEC markets, 
under the provisions of the Athens Agreement. 
 
The restoration of democracy in 1974 brought significant challenges to policy makers, 
not least, with regard to the introduction of institutional safeguards to prevent a 
relapse. The attention of planners was occupied with political and legal institution 
building, including the difficult preparations for formal accession to the EEC. It is 
probably because of this that there is little during that period that could be directly 
interpreted as technology policy. The 1970s heralded the beginning of a long period 
of global macroeconomic volatility which was to affect Greece profoundly. The weak 
Greek economy was unprepared for the effects of the two oil crises in 1973-74 and 
again 1979; cost increases manifested themselves in rapidly accelerating inflation, in 
turn calling for strict credit control with a commensurate effect on investment. In the 
immediate aftermath of the oil shocks total investment shrunk by 25.6 per cent in 
1974 and then again by 6.5 per cent in 1980 (Drakatos, 1997: 84). A packet of 
carefully crafted incentives and the prospect of full EEC membership allowed for a 
modest flow of FDI inputs to resume (UNCTAD, 2004). 
 
Greece’s accession to the EEC in 1981 marks the birth of modern self-contained STI 
policy. As is to be expected, government policy on innovation was initiated in direct 
response to EEC membership and was by extension greatly influenced by the 
                                                 
9 The democratic deficit was economically dire in a number of ways, many of which were indirect and 
had long-term effects. The regime sought legitimisation by appealing to Greek national sentiment 
(Papandreou, 1973). It did so by promoting customs and tradition, Greek antiquity, religious values and 
awareness of Greece’s perceived ‘enemies’ east and west. A package that eventually culminated in the 
Cyprus events of 1974 and a renewed Greco-Turkish geopolitical antagonism that continues to this day. 
This ‘heritage’ has meant that the proportion of Greek GDP spent on defence is almost twice the 
average of either the EU or NATO (Athanassiou et al. 2000) – that is of course to say nothing of its 
effect in shaping a conservative popular culture. The period also sees a sharp rise in popular animosity 
against the U.S.– widely believed to have supported the regime.   14
orientation of the Community’s technology policy
10. The 1980s also saw sharp 
changes in economic policy, with a left-leaning government favouring economic 
expansion at the expense of fiscal prudence. Financed by extensive borrowing and 
EEC aid, the government undertook the construction of an elaborate social welfare 
system (health, social services and education), backed massive expansion in state 
corporations and increased defence spending. Much of this expenditure was not 
directed at productive investment, but represented an inherently unsustainable 
expansion of state services (Drakatos, 1997; Alogoskoufis, 1997).  
 
It is against this backdrop that the first formative steps towards the creation of a STI 
policy took place. This early STI framework followed an input-oriented approach 
where the purchase of equipment and the introduction of associated infrastructure 
took priority (Korres, 1995). The focus on infrastructure was motivated by a 
realisation that Greece lagged behind in the diffusion of several key technologies for 
development; it was also a policy that was not incompatible with contemporary 
economic views that perceived a positive link between public investment in 
infrastructure and productivity (e.g. see Aschauer, 1989). A political business cycle 
exerted its effect too. Lambrinidis et al. (2005) demonstrate that public infrastructure 
investment peaked in the years preceding national elections. Along similar lines, the 
modernisation of the primary sector (agriculture, fisheries, minerals) materialised in 
the form of subsidies for the purchase of imported equipment. Its positive contribution 
was limited to a one-off effect in productivity gains and international competitiveness.  
 
Reflected in their magnitude is the lower priority attributed to capital inputs in 
education and basic research; throughout the 1980s Greece consistently spent the 
lowest proportion of its GDP in education among its European partners (OECD, 
2004b) while Government Expenditure on Research and Development (GOVERD) as 
a percentage of GDP was among the lowest in the OECD (2004a). To be sure, funds 
directed at the nascent Public Research Institutes (PRIs) were significant by 
contemporary standards, if only because there is no earlier point of reference that 
comparisons can be made against. Funds directed towards PRIs and universities 
encouraged the creation of an incipient research community
11 and backed it with 
fledgling infrastructure
12. Importantly though, no formal mechanisms were 
established for linking tertiary education to industrial needs, contemporary or 
                                                 
10 This was to become a recurring theme in Greek innovation policy and one that continues to this day. 
Policy drafted at the European level directly translated into commensurate actions at the national level. 
Spurred on by European funding, innovation policy programmes were (as a rule) only hastily adjusted 
to meet the agendas of co-ordinating national bodies with little regard for national specificities. In any 
case national needs have been difficult to identify due to a lack of detailed innovation statistics. At the 
same time there has been an insufficient institutional framework for implementation. Unlike Ireland, in 
the case of Greece the responsibility for the co-ordination of innovation projects rests with high-level 
policy makers (ministries and ministerial secretariats) that possess incomplete information of individual 
needs and are unable to efficiently micromanage. 
11 Beneficiaries of such funding included the then newly established (1980) National Documentation 
Centre (national database and knowledge dissemination overseer body), the National Hellenic 
Research Foundation (a research centre focusing on basic science and the humanities), the Hellenic 
Organisation for Standardisation (ELOT), the Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research 
(IOBE) and others.  
12 FORTHnet, a national computer network facilitating data interchange among Greek Universities and 
Research Institutes and linking them with similar networks abroad was initiated in 1984. Its later 
commercialisation paved the way for the spread of the Internet in Greece. Today FORTHnet is one of 
the largest Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in the country.     15
anticipated
13. The skills profile of Greek graduates was more a reflection of 
departmental politics and the inflexibilities of public sector employment legislation 
than real occupational demand. True then as is today, education was seen as simply 
another welfare expenditure, not an investment in human capital, with social as well 
as private returns.   
 
Furthermore, attempts were made to lower the cost of market entry in a number of 
capital-intensive and high technology sectors
14. Among the measures employed were 
higher subsidies and investment grants
15 directed at start-ups in these favoured 
sectors. However, Anagnostaki and Louri (1995) show that this policy did not succeed 
in increasing their relative output
16 in the economy. While ideology and political-
cycle driven state expansionism had a detrimental effect in national accounts and 
further stimulated the already existing inflationary pressures (Alogoskoufis, 1997), in 
common with the 1960s experience, it did appear to stimulate private investment. Far 
from crowding out private funds, there is evidence to suggest that increased public 
expenditure
17 throughout the 1980s had a positive (albeit small) effect on private 
investment throughout Greece’s regions (Laopodis, 2001). However the qualitative 
elements of public expenditure indicate that economic policy did not have a single 
strategic aim in focus but rather allocated funds in whatever short-term target 
maintained an appearance of profitability. Indirect evidence indicate that 
infrastructure investment in particular was aimed at alleviating regional disparities
18 
(Lambrinidis et al., 2005) while simultaneously pursuing the (potentially conflicting) 
target of improving international competitiveness.  
 
More profound were the effects of institutional interventions that took place during 
this time. These included the establishment of the short-lived Ministry for Research 
and Technology (1982-1985) and the general overseer body that is still around today, 
the General Secretariat for Research and Technology (GSRT) in 1985
19. The GSRT 
undertook a mission to implement technology and innovation policy with provisions 
for technology transfer, education and training as well as research and development. 
The foundation of GSRT was an important event in its own right as it signalled a 
long-term commitment to technological matters. The institutional framework 
surrounding intellectual property rights was also strengthened by the foundation of the 
Organisation for Industrial Property (OBI), the Greek patent registration office in 
1987. Another noteworthy organisational development was the founding of the 
Hellenic Organisation of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises & Handicraft 
(EOMMEX), a body overseeing the co-ordination government programmers relating 
                                                 
13 This is an inadequacy that persists to this day (Liagouras et al. 2003). 
14 Sectors with main activity the manufacture of rubber and plastics, chemicals, petroleum and coal 
derivatives, non- metallic minerals, basic metals, metal products, machinery, electrical appliances and 
electronics (Anagnostaki and Louri, 1995) 
15 Under the provisions of Law 1262/82 eligible sectors are those under SIC 30-37. 
16 “While numbers of entrants were shifted significantly upwards in the favoured sectors, their total 
assets were not affected. Thus, since relative sizes were not influenced the effect of policy in 
restructuring must have been minimal.” (Anagnostaki and Louri, 1995: 66) 
17 This result does not appear to hold however with regard to military expenditure (Laopodis, 2001). 
18 Using a panel of regional infrastructure investment data for the period 1982-1994, Lambrinidis et al. 
(2005) found, among other things, that infrastructure allocations were negatively associated with 
regional product per capita  and positively associated with the existing stock of infrastructure capital as 
well as with the proportion of regional GDP originating in agriculture.  
19 Which consequently fell under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Industry (1985-1996) and then the 
Ministry of Development (1996 to present).   16
to small businesses. Additionally, the law 1514/85 outlined the institutional 
framework for the development of scientific research and was a legal cornerstone for 
Greek technology policy (GSRT, 2004b). The law established for the first time in 
Greece the role of a ‘researcher’ as distinct of that of other employees in tertiary 
education. As a consequence, it opened the possibility of research funding and 
facilitated the measurement of research output in Greek universities and other 
research institutions. The same legislation outlined a framework for the management 
of PRIs and declared that the direction of R&D should be in the country’s ‘economic 
interest’. 
 
While many of these institutional developments had their parallels in Ireland (e.g. 
GSRT vs. Forfás) – the contemporaneous Irish institutional mix is in sharp contrast, 
particularly with regards to the degree of its diversification and a related division of 
labour across the different facets of innovation policy. Contrary to the case of Greece 
where high-level ministerial bodies have traditionally attempted to micromanage all 
aspects of innovation policy, Ireland possessed a diverse set of small, institutionally-
autonomous ‘policy enactors’ (e.g. the IDA, SFI, HEA and the various research 
councils - see Pontikakis et al. 2006) who continuously interacted with relevant 
stakeholders, acting as loci for the accumulation of valuable context-specific 
knowledge. Crucially it was this experience that allowed them to identify perverse 
incentives and inform the drafting of effective, context-tailored prescriptions.  
 
The 1990s posed a number of challenges for planners emanating from the country’s 
membership in what was to become the European Union (EU). Participation in the 
1992 customs union and preparations for European Monetary Union (EMU) 
monopolised the policy debate. The globalisation and liberalisation of the Greek 
economy that followed increased the competitive pressure among enterprises mainly 
in the manufacturing and services sectors, and less in the agricultural sector 
(Anastassopoulos, 2003). Incoming FDI, before and after 1992, was concentrated on 
traditional sectors (primarily trade and the provision of services) where it displaced 
uncompetitive domestic firms. 
 
At the same time, a single, long-term policy with regards to technology and 
innovation was still an elusive target. Dependence on EU funding, ministerial 
intervention and (almost exclusively) state-sponsored R&D output characterised the 
Greek national innovation system. Not that the emergence of a coherent innovation 
system had been actively promoted; prior to the 1990s no concrete provision for the 
facilitation of a national innovation system had been made, where institutional actors 
from education, research, the state and industry could come together to foster R&D 
and diffusion. Policy making in the area involved measuring the yield of inputs onto 
specific outputs while ignoring underlying communication and feedback mechanisms 
as outlined in systemic approaches to innovation (e.g. see Lundvall, 1992, Freeman, 
1995 and Edquist, 1997). Well into the 1990s different policy actors largely perceived 
the institutions under their authority to operate in isolation and drew policy 
accordingly. Multiple government ministries had taken on the task to promote 
innovation and the spread of technology. Such a responsibility overlap is, in some   17
areas, still prevalent today
20. The GSRT aimed to change this situation by assuming a 
central role in coordinating the evolution of a national innovation system. 
 
The lack of adequate (country-specific) statistics and accompanying analysis on the 
field also hampered the formulation of effective technology policy. In a rapidly 
developing economy (as was Greece during the 1990s) an initial technological needs 
analysis, followed by specific policy responses, could provide a stepstone upon which 
a broader technology policy framework could evolve. This was attempted by the 
Development Ministry’s “EPET I” (1990-1992) (Research and Technology Executive 
Programme), “STRIDE Hellas” (1992-1994) and “EPET II” (1994-1999) which 
sought to “upgrade the research and technology infrastructure and develop important 
research products”. EPET I embarked on the direct funding of basic scientific R&D 
projects deemed of relevance to the Greek economic and social reality, industrial 
R&D (manufacturing, construction and especially ICT) and University research. A 
major initiative was the establishment of technology parks to act as contact conduits 
between the research community and industry (Kellesidis, 1998; Bakouros et al. 
2002). Funded by the EU’s Framework Programme
21, EPET I aimed to encourage 
technology transfer and diffusion via the creation of technology parks and 
technological and human resource databases
22. In addition it carried for the first time, 
the responsibility for the assessment of Greek technology policy and the provision of 
new overall policy recommendations. STRIDE Hellas was essentially an extension of 
EPET I, with a renewed emphasis on interaction between research actors and industry. 
EPET II however, set more ambitious targets. EPET II aimed to support S&T 
activities particularly in innovation-intensive industries (ICT, biotechnology, new 
materials) (GSRT, 2003).  
 
The programmes have so far delivered only modest results; while research output (in 
terms of publications and patents per capita) has been consistently increasing after the 
1980s, in relative terms Greece continues to occupy the last positions among 
European innovation league tables. A key failing has been the lack of engagement 
with the private sector
23 and in particular, with technologically leading multinational 
enterprises. The more recent (1996) founding of Hellenic Centre for Investment 
(ELKE) aims to correct this by promoting a set of legal incentives to such firms 
(ELKE, 2003). The Greek economy is also making progress in the diffusion of key 
technologies (OECD, 2001). However the spread of technological hardware is 
contemporaneous with only limited productivity improvements (Maudos et al., 2003).  
  
Not unrelated is the issue of the skill content of the Greek workforce. Despite 
evidence of technical change, the Greek economy still suffers from a particularly 
acute problem of higher unemployment among its skilled workforce
24. Nelson and 
                                                 
20 The Ministry of Education, The Ministry of Development, the Ministry of Industry, the Interior 
Ministry, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Economy and Finance are all directly involved in 
funding R&D, training personnel and facilitating the spread and assimilation of new technologies 
(National Documentation Centre, 2003). 
21 Later Programmes (Stride Hellas, EPET II etc) have also been dependent of EU funds. 
22 The so-called “Innovation Relay Centres” (IRCs). 
23 Data from the OECD (2004) show that Greece and Portugal jointly occupy the last position within 
the EU (15) in terms of Business Expenditure in Research and Development (BERD) as a proportion of 
Gross Expenditure in Research and Development (GERD). 
24 In an observation that could just as well hold true for modern Greece, Mokyr (1992) brings down the 
inability of ancient Graeco-Roman society to sustain continuous innovation to the then prevalent   18
Phelps’ (1966) seminal work indicated how the diffusion of technological equipment 
may have a positive effect on the employment of skilled workers. It comes therefore 
as a surprise that, while (thanks in part to policy interventions) technological 
hardware has proliferated throughout Greek industry, overall demand for highly 
skilled workers is still low (Logotech, 2001; Liagouras et al. 2003). Astonishingly, 
Asteriou and Agiomirgianakis (2001) found that the social returns to university 
education in particular were negative. In contrast with this observation is the shortage 
in ICT skills highlighted by Zambarloukos and Constantelou (2002)
25. The above 
underline that the qualitative elements of ‘technical change’ and the content of skill’ 
are important
26. The chronic disassociation of the education system from market 
needs is probably the ultimate culprit.  There is much to be achieved by an alignment 
of industrial with education policy under the umbrella of innovation; a study of Greek 
manufacturing in the period 1995-1996 found that high technology and capital-
intensive manufacturing sectors contribute mostly to net employment growth 
(Voulgaris et al., 2005). Technical change in key sectors can stimulate demand for 
specific skills; a plan that aims to stimulate demand for skilled workers will have to be 
the result of a continuous feedback process between education and industrial policy. 
 
The fact that the overall direction of STI policy is initiated at the EU level is also a 
mixed blessing. Arguably EU-directed programmes are useful in stimulating interest 
and activity in the area of STI that would otherwise receive little attention. Their 
contribution in providing general direction towards proven effective technology 
policies is notable. Perhaps most importantly, such programmes provide much needed 
funds in the form of the Community Support Framework for structural adjustments 
that poorer EU countries such as Greece could not afford otherwise. At present, EU 
technology policy fosters R&D and diffusion through the development of pan-
European innovation institutions aimed not only at the creation of national innovation 
systems but also at the long-term development of supranational synergies among 
member states. There is little doubt that the development of cross-boundary 
technology linkages would be a positive development. Nonetheless, this integrationist 
agenda meant that technology policy in Greece has been gearing institutions to 
promote a national ‘innovation system’ to the extent that it belongs to an EU-wide 
supranational innovation system.  
 
It is the priority assigned to these supranational synergies that has called for uniform, 
blanket approaches to EU policy schemes (with the possible exception of the regional 
aspects of such programmes
27). However, EU technology policy is frequently based 
on assumptions and is fine-tuned according to the economic reality prevalent in the 
core Western European economies. These are countries with developed economies, 
                                                                                                                                            
manning of productive professions with slaves. He concludes that: “In a society in which those who are 
educated do not work and those who work are not educated, the inarticulateness of the productive 
classes will thwart the diffusion and adoption of new technology in the unlikely event that it emerges” 
(Mokyr, 1992: 175) 
25 In another study, Liagouras et al. (2004) propose that the position of Greek companies along global 
production chains (raw material extraction, transport and logistics) are the ultimate reason behind their 
lack of interest in innovation. 
26 The case of Greece indicates that the association may hold as long as skill is not defined solely 
quantitatively (e.g. years of schooling) but its qualities (i.e. relevance to occupational needs) are also 
considered. 
27 Even region-specific programmes tend to group together European regions on the basis of common 
characteristics. This is arguably an approach that hardly accounts for national specificities.    19
long-established scientific and R&D traditions, with efficient accompanying 
institutional frameworks which are at the forefront of technological development. 
Their requirements with regards to the assimilation of the very latest technologies and 
the sustainability of their current thrust in the generation of innovative ideas place 
them at a very different position to that of poorer countries in the European periphery. 
This is the main thesis of Liagouras et al. (2004) who argue that technology policy 
should be primarily motivated by country-specific needs. Liagouras et al. (2004) 
review the behaviour of market and policy actors in Greece in the emerging fields of 
biotechnology and e-commerce. They found that (EU funded) EPET II schemes had 
very little success in stimulating collaborative projects, adoption and R&D in neither 
field (biotechnology nor e-commerce). They believe that this failure comes down to 
the different characteristics of the Greek pharmaceutical, agricultural and IT sectors as 
opposed to the rest of Europe. Operations in the aforementioned industries in Greece 
are largely confined to the later stages of production (packaging, marketing, 
distribution) where there is little scope for innovative activity. Liagouras et al. (2004) 
conclude that the mere imitation of technology policies of economically advanced 
countries could prove totally inappropriate for economic laggards. They propose that 
intermediate economies should focus on upgrading productive capacities while 
stimulating domestic demand for innovations.  
 
Most of the current inadequacies are essentially structural problems; the much hyped 
structural transformation has yet to materialise. It is because of its sectoral nature (and 
the position of companies within the lateral stages of production within those sectors) 
that Greek industry exhibits low demand for high-skilled workers and does not think 
innovation a profitable venture. So far policy appears to have delivered modest 
results; while there are signs of improvement, it is clear that it has as of yet not 
succeeded in generating the momentum necessary for a sustainable, market-driven 
and market-oriented national innovation system. The GSRT (2003a) acknowledges 
the need for policy adjustments based on the experience of EPET I, STRIDER Hellas 
and EPET II. It has formulated a new Executive Programme of Competitiveness 
(EPAN) to run in the period 2000-2006 on funding provided by the EU’s Community 
Support Framework. Notable are also recent attempts to benchmark the results of 
policy and draft long-term innovation policy that is detached by the ephemerality of 
EU programmes. The recent Technology Foresight Exercise forms part of this overall 
process and in that respect is a step in the right direction. 
 
By antithesis the case of Ireland serves to underscore key policy differentiators. 
There, sectorally defined structural change came about as the result of a conscious, 
concerted effort to attract investment from a number of technological leaders. This 
happened because a diverse set of flexible and politically autonomous policy enactors 
were given a clear mandate to pursue this agenda. These policy enactors could act in 
the knowledge that the overall direction of their work would not be determined by the 
casual whims of alternating ministers or by the uncertain nature of EU funding. The 
above of course were the product of a climate of consensus, emerging in response to a 
severe employment problem. They were also conditional on the effort of an efficient 
and honest public sector. The quality of the public sector apparatus itself is also a 
sharp delineator between the two countries. In a study of 20 OECD countries 
assessing the long-term efficiency of their public sectors, Greece fared consistently 
last while Ireland occupied one the top five positions in every measure considered 




Up until the 1980s there was little that separated the Greek from the Irish case. Both 
countries possessed economies with overwhelmingly large primary sectors and had 
suffered from their positions on the European periphery. Both earned the label 
‘cohesion’ country owing to their depressed output and both had been major 
benefactors of European structural funds. What differentiates the Irish experience 
from its Greek counterpart is how both approached the solution to their entrenched 
problems. The best way to describe this is that the Irish approached the 1980s and 
economic misfortune as an employment problem, while Greek policy makers 
perceived their economic woes as the result of output and productivity deficits. With 
different perceptions of the problems, came different attempts at the solutions. In 
terms of the use of technology policy in an attempt to address poor economic 
performances, the Athens government favoured policies that focused on inputs in 
infrastructure and capital goods. Their counterparts in Dublin placed a greater 
emphasis on the development of skilled labour force as a supply-push motivator for 
employment growth (Healy, 1983). 
 
The 1980s were very much a decade of centralisation in Europe, where, the first to 
suffer were those on the periphery. Therefore, with the shifting of manufacturing 
activity away from Europe, employment in manufacturing fell sharply in all countries 
removed from the EU core. Ireland and Greece were no testament to this process. But 
it was the track that Ireland set about in the late 1980s and early 1990s that would see 
it reach levels of growth that could never have been predicted. What Ireland did was 
continue to pursue a select amount of high growth potential foreign investors with the 
immediate goal of creating employment and the longer-term goal of positive 
spillovers for the local economy. At the same time it employed a flexible set of policy 
enactors (such as the IDA, SFI, ACC, IBEC, Research Councils etc.) which provided 
the basis for continued FDI-led growth, in high-tech, capital- and skilled labour-
intensive operations. The a constant in-tune institutional support gave confidence to 
foreign investors in Ireland, the result of which has seen Irish operations of US MNCs 
most likely to achieve EU headquarters status than any other European country.  
 
However Greek policy had no long-term strategic provisions. A culture of 
Dependency had set in in Greece, for too long it had been a major benefactor of funds 
from the Marshall plan to EU structural funds. Industrial policy had grown contingent 
on the presence of these funds. Also, the use to which these funds were put was very 
different from that in Ireland. As was very much acceptable at the time – and 
espoused by many theorists as a crucial part of the development process, Greece 
placed a greater emphasis on physical infrastructure at the expense of social or 
economic infrastructures. The lack of policy and especially flexible policy enactors 
has been detrimental to the Greek case. A coherent set of institutions and guidelines 
were absent and has contributed to a lack of ‘political entrepreneurialism’ which in 
itself is responsible for an entrepreneurial culture that is inherently risk averse
28.  
 
                                                 
28 Throughout the post-war period the economic environment presented few rewards for those taking 
risks.   21
So the cases of Ireland and Greece diverged over 20 years ago. In retrospect, Ireland’s 
unemployment rates of 20% may have been what sparked the country into an 
innovative answer. As opposed to Greece, which saw the problem as the less tangible 
productivity decline
29, Ireland was faced with its inertia on a daily basis with 
unemployment being a main political issue. Its response through the construction of 
social infrastructures such as investment in education as well as the creation of an 
economic climate amiable to foreign monies proved to be part of the answer to its 
problems. Yet, as mentioned at the outset, neither Greece nor Ireland fares well in 
terms of international indicators for R&D (see European Innovation Scoreboard, 
2003). What we have attempted to make explicit here through our focus on the Irish 
case is a need to broaden the definition of innovation beyond the laboratory. The 
place of process innovation in terms of what O’Riain (2004) terms 
‘intraprenuerialism’ needs to be recognised. The application of new practices to 
increase the mandates of Ireland’s most productive sector (the MNCs) also needs to 
be recognised as innovative behaviour. With a more extensive idea of innovative 
activity that relates to wealth creation, documents like the Lisbon Agenda will prove 
to be much more beneficial to countries like Greece and the most recent member 































                                                 
29 Approaching the problem from a productivity and growth perspective removed its sense of urgency.   22
REFERENCES 
 
Afonso, A., Schuknecht, L. and Tanzi, V. (2003), “Public Sector Efficiency: An 




Alogoskoufis, G. (1997), Greek Economic Policy in Crisis, Second Edition, Kritiki 
Publications, Athens, (original title in Greek “Η Κρίση της Οικονοµικής Πολιτικής”) 
 
Anagnostaki, V. and Louri, H. (1995), “Manufacturing entry in Greece, 1982-1988: 
did sectoral policy work?”, Journal of Economic Studies, Vol. 22, No. 6, pp 60-68 
 
Anastassopoulos, G. (2003), “MNE subsidiaries versus domestic enterprises: an 
analysis of their ownership and location-specific advantages”, Applied Economics, 
No. 35, pp 1050-1514    
 
Aschauer, D.A. (1989), “Is public expenditure productive?”, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, Volume 23, Issue 2, pp. 177-200 
 
Asteriou, D. and Agiomirgianakis, G. M. (2001), “Human capital and economic 
growth: Time series evidence from Greece”, Journal of Policy Modelling, Vol. 23, pp 
481-489 
 
Athanassiou, E., Kollias, C. Nikolaidou, E. and Zografakis, S. (2000), “Greece: 
Military Expenditure, Economic Growth and the Opportunity Cost of Defence” 
Middlesex University Business School, Working Paper No. 8, March  
 
Bakouros, Y. L., Mardas, D. C., and Varsakelis, N. C. (2002), “Science park, a high 
tech fantasy?: an analysis of the science parks of Greece”, Technovation, No. 22, pp 
123-128 
 
Breathnach, M. and Kelly, D., (1999), ‘Multinationals, subcontracting linkages and 
the innovative performance of indigenous firms: some Irish evidence’, paper 
presented at the European Network on Industrial Policy International ICTICe; Dublin, 
9-10 December 
 
Begley, T, Delaney, E and O’Gorman, C (2005) Ireland at a Crossroads: Still a 
Magnet for Corporate Investment Organizational Dynamics 34 (3) 202 –217 
 
Coe, N., Hess, M., Yeung, H., Dicken, P. and Henderson, J. (2004) ‘Globailizing’ 
regional development: a global production networks perspective Transactions 29 (4) 
468-484 
 
Cogan, D and McDevitt, J (2000) Science Technology and Innovation Policy and 
Evaluation. Paper presented to the CONVERGE Workshop Madrid, 5 October 2000 
  
Collins, P and Grimes, S (2005) “Strategic leveraging of power by foreign owned 
MNCs in Ireland” Paper Presented to the Regional Studies Association, Irish Branch, 
April 14
th 2005   23
 
Culliton Report (1992), A Time for Change: Industrial Policy for the 1990s, Report of 
the Industrial Review Group, Dublin: Stationery Office. 
 
Dertilis, G. B., and Fragkiadis A. (1999), “Landmarks of the Greek Economy in the 
20
th Century”, Greek Economic Post, Issue 23/12/1999, Lambrakis Publications, 
Athens 
 
Drakatos, K., 1997, The Big Cycle of the Greek Economy; 1945-1995, Papazisi 
Publications, Athens, original title: “O Megalos Kyklos tis Ellinikis Oikonomias” 
 
Edquist, C. (ed.) (1997), Systems of Innovation: Technologies, Institutions and 
Organizations, Pinter, London 
 
ELKE (2003), “Invest in Greece: Research and Development”, Hellenic Center for 
Investment, http://www.elke.gr/files/publications/RandD.zip, 6/6/2006 
 
European Innovation Scoreboard (2002) ‘European Innovation Scoreboard: Technical 
Paper No. 3: EU regions’ November 2002; available at http://trendchart.cordis.lu/  
July, 2003 
 
Forfás (2004) Ahead of the Curve: Ireland’s Place in the Global Economy, (2004), 
Available from: http://www.forfas.ie/publications/esg040707/  
   
Forfás (2005) Annual Employment Survey 2004, May 2005 
 
Freeman, C. (1995), “The National System of Innovation in Historical Perspective”, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 19, pp. 5-24 
 
Furman, J. L., Porter, M. E. and Stern S. (2002), “The determinants of national 
innovative capacity”, Research Policy, August, Vol. 31, No. 6, pp. 899-933 
 
Grimes, S and Collins, P., (2003) Building a Knowledge Economy in Ireland Through 
European Research Networks, European Planning Studies, 11 (3) pp. 395 - 413 
 
GSRT (2003a), “Research and Technology: Ministry of Development’s Priorities”, 
GSRT, Ministry of Development, http://www.gsrt.gr/site.asp?cat=137&id=348, 
9/23/03 
 
GSRT (2003b), “Towards the knowledge economy: Prospects and Roles”, GSRT, 
Ministry of Development, November, http://www.gsrt.gr/site.asp?cat=137&id=348, 
9/23/03 
 
GSRT (2004a), “Basic Priorities of Research and Technology Policy”, GSRT, 
Ministry of Development, http://www.gsrt.gr/default.asp?V_ITEM_ID=139, 8/10/04 
 
GSRT (2004b), “History – Important Milestones in the history of the GSRT”, GSRT, 
Ministry of Development, http://www.gsrt.gr/default.asp?V_ITEM_ID=1868, 8/10/04 
   24
Healy, M. (1983), “Innovative Ireland-Technological, Industrial and Societal 
Challenges”, Technovation, 2, pp. 45-53 
 
Hilliard, R and Green, R (2005) Innovation Policy Governance and Institutional 
Change in Ireland. Paper to be presented at the DRUID Tenth Anniversary Summer 
Conference, Denmark, June 27
th 2005 
 
IDA (2005) Why Invest in Ireland? Vital Social and Economic Statistics The  
Industrial Development Agency; Dublin. 2004 Annual Report/2003 Annual Report, 
available at: http://www.idaireland.com/home/index.aspx?id=83  
 
Kennedy K.A., Giblin, T. and McHugh, D., (1998), The Economic Development of 
Ireland in the Twentieth Century, London: Routledge.  
 
Kirby, P., (2002) The Celtic Tiger in Distress: Growth with inequality in Ireland 
Palgrave, New York. 
 
Kelessidis, V. C. (1998), “The Role of Technology Parks in Regional Development – 
The Case of Northern Greece”, XV IASP World Conference on Science and 
Technology Parks, http://www.mred.tuc.gr/home/kelesidi/TP_01.pdf, 29/08/04 
 
Korres, G. M. (1995), “Technological Performance in Greece with the European 
Community”, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of London, Queen Mary and 
Westfield College 
 
Lambrinidis, M. Psycharis, Y. and Rovolis, A. (2005), “Regional Allocation of Public 
Infrastructure Investment: The Case of Greece”, Regional Studies, Vol. 39, No. 9, pp 
1231-1244 
 
Laopodis, N.T. (2001), Effects of Government Spending on Net Private Investment, 
Applied Economics, Vol. 33, No 12, pp. 1563-1577 
 
Liagouras, G., Protogerou, A. and Caloghirou, Y. (2003), “Exploring Mismatches 
Between Higher Education and the Labour Market in Greece”, European Journal of 
Education, Vol. 38, No. 4, pp 413-426 
 
Liagouras, G., Zambarloukos, S. and Constantelou, A. (2004), “The Long Road from 
Technology to Development: Impasses and Challenges of Technology Policy in 
Intermediate Economies”, DRUID Summer Conference 2004 on Industrial Dynamics, 
Innovation and Development, http://www.druid.dk/ocs/viewpaper.php?id=95&cf=1, 
10/11/2004 
 
Logotech (2001), “National Innovation Survey in Greek Enterprises; 1994 – 1998”, 
General Secretariat of Research and Technology, Athens  
 
Lundvall, B. Å. (1992) (ed), National Systems of Innovation: Towards a Theory of 
Innovation and Interactive Learning, Pinter, London 
 
MacLaughlin, J (1994) Ireland the Emigrant Nursery and the World Economy, Cork, 
Cork University Press   25
 
Margolis, S.E. and Liebowitz, S.J. (1995), “Path Dependence, Lock-in and History”, 
Journal of Law Economics and Organization, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 205-206 
 
Maudos, J., Pastor, J.M. and Serrano, L. (2003), “Human Capital in OECD Countries: 
technical change, efficiency and productivity”, International Review of Applied 
Economics, Vol. 17, No. 4, October, pp. 419-435 
 
Munck, R (1993) The Irish Economy: Results and Prospects London, Pluto Press  
 
Mokyr, J. (1992), The Lever of Riches, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
 
National Documentation Centre (2001), “Science and Technology Indicators”, 
http://www.ekt.gr/en/rtd-serv/st_indicators_gr/themeII.html, 11/06/03 
 
National Documentation Centre (2003), “R&D and Innovation in Greece”, 
http://cordis.europa.eu/greece/rd_system1.htm, 4/6/2003 
O’Donnell, R., (2000) Europe: the Irish Experience. Institute of European Affairs.  
 
Nelson, R. and Phelps, E.S. (1966), “Investment in Humans, Technological Diffusion, 
and Economic Growth”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 56, No. 1/2, pp. 69-
75 
 
Ó’Gráda, C., (1997) A Rocky Road: The Irish Economy since the 1920s Manchester:  
Manchester University Press.  
 
O’Hagan, J.W. (1995) The Economy of Ireland: Policy and Performance of a Small 
European Country, Dublin: Gill and MacMillan. 
 
 
O’Hearn, D., (1989) The Irish Case of Dependency: An exception to the exceptions? 
American Sociological Review 54: 4 pp. 578-96 
 
O’Hearn, D., (1993) Global Competition, Europe and Irish Peripherality, The 
Economic and Social Review 24:2 pp. 169-97  
 
O’Hearn, D., (2002) The Atlantic economy: Britain, the US and Ireland” Manchester:  
Manchester University Press. 
 
O'Malley, E., (1992). Problems of Industrialisation in Ireland, in I.H. Goldthorpe and 
C.T. Whelan (eds) The Development of Industrial Society in Ireland, pp. 125 - 154 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
O'Malley, E., (1998), 'The revival of Irish indigenous industry 1987-1997' Quarterly 
Economic Commentary, April, pp. 35-60. 
 
O’Riain, S., (1998) A Tale of Two Globalisations: the Irish Software Industry and the 
Global Economy. Working Paper No. 10l, ESRI, Dublin.  
   26
O’ Riain, S., (2000), The flexible developmental state: globalization, information 
technology, and the “Celtic tiger”, Politics and Society, 28(2), pp. 157-94.  
 
O’Riain, S., (2004) The Politics of Mobility in Technology-Driven Commodity 
Chains: Developmental Coalitions in the Irish Software Industry. International Journal 
of Urban and Regional Research 28(3):642-663 
 
OECD (2002), “Greece Progress in Structural Reform”, OECD Economic Surveys, 
No. 13, pp 269-364 
 
OECD (2004a), Main Science and Technology Indicators, OECD Publications, Paris 
 
OECD (2004b), Education at a Glance: OECD Indicators, OECD Publications, Paris 
 




Papanastassiou, M., (1999), “Technology and production strategies of multinational 
enterprise (MNE) subsidiaries in Europe”, International Business Review, No 8, pp. 
213-232 
 
Papandreou, A. (1973), Democracy at the gunpoint. Pelican, London  
 
Papazafeiropoulou, A., Pouloudi, A. and Doukidis, G. (2000), “Electronic Commerce 
Policy Making in Greece”, Working Paper, Athens University of Economics and 
Business, http://www.eltrun.gr/papers/bit.pdf 
 
Pontikakis, D., McDonnell, T. and Geoghegan, W. (2006), “Ireland’s National 
Innovation System: An Exploratory Study of Supporting Institutions and Dynamic 
Actors”, Prometheus, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 37-58 
 
Psalidopoulos, M. (2004), “Economic Thought and Greek Post-World War II 
Reconstruction, 1044-1953”, The University of Athens Doctoral Programme in 
Economics Seminar, Department of Economics, October 
 
Stasinopoulos, G. (2006), “Before the ‘take-off’: Economic Policy in Greece during 
the period of reconstruction, 1945-1953”, Economic History Seminar, Department of 
Economics, University of Athens 
 
Telesis (1982) Review of Industrial Policy. Dublin; Stationery Office 
 
Transparency International (2003), “Corruption Perceptions Index 2002”, Berlin, 
August, available on: http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2002/cpi2002.en.html, 
11/02/03 
 
UN (2001), Human Development Report: Making New Technologies Work for Human 
Development, UNDP, Oxford University Press, New York 
   27
UNCTAD (2004), “FDI Statistics: Greece”, United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, 
http://r0.unctad.org/en/subsites/dite/fdistats_files/pdfs/Greece_profile.pdf, 10/05/04  
 
Varvaressos, K. (2002), Report on the Economic Problem in Greece, Revised edition 
edited by Lykogiannis A. (original 1952), Savvalas Publications, Athens 
 
Voulgaris, F., Papadogonas, T. and Agiomirgianakis, G. (2005), “Job Creation and 
Job Destruction in Greek Manufacturing”, Review of Development Economics, Vol. 
9, No. 2, pp. 289-301 
 
Zambarloukos, S. and Constantelou, A. (2002), “Learning and skills formation in the 
new economy: evidence from Greece”, International Journal of Training and 
Development, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 240-253 
 
 